In response to Republicans’ failure to repeal the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Trump Administration is using administrative action to modify the ACA and health insurance options for Americans. On October 12, 2017, President Trump signed an executive order that instructs various departments to consider regulations related to association health plans and short-term insurance. Shortly after, the Administration announced that they would no longer make cost sharing reduction (CSR) payments to insurers on the Exchanges.  Section 1402 of the ACA requires insurance companies to reduce the amount that eligible low-income policyholders pay out of pocket for co-payments and deductibles.  Accordingly, the federal government must reimburse insurers for reductions when the Secretary of HHS is notified.

Without these payments, insurers will either increase premiums or pull out of the Exchanges altogether. In anticipation of the announcement, some insurers have already increased premiums for the 2018 enrollment period. In spite of this, policy makers can mitigate the harm that could be felt as a result of not funding CSR payments.

The Passage of the Murray-Alexander Stabilization Bill

Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) and Ranking Member Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) revealed a bipartisan plan to help stabilize the insurance market. The Murray-Alexander Bill seeks to stabilize the insurance market by funding the CSR subsidies and increasing state flexibility in their administration of the Marketplace.

The bill proposes to fund CSR payments for the remainder of 2017, as well as 2018 and 2019. The bill also reduces the time for the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) review of 1332 waivers, from 180 days to 90 days and creates a new 45 day expedited review process for qualifying circumstances. Through Section 1332 waivers, states are allowed to implement insurance market innovations that provide coverage “comparable” in benefits and affordability.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scored the Murray-Alexander Bill and found that it would cut the federal deficit by $3.8 billion in the next decade. The CBO notes that savings would come from states offering lower-cost policies, attracting younger and healthier individuals into the market.  Insurers would lower their premiums because of the influx of younger individuals and in the long-term, save the government more than $1.1 billion in premium tax credits. Despite the savings scored by CBO, the Murray-Alexander bill will not have an affect on 2018 plans. Further, the bill may not pass before open enrollment ends on December 15.  The bill has bipartisan support in the Senate, but will have difficulties in the House because of Speaker Paul Ryan’s opposition to the current version.

State Efforts

States can play a role in telling insurers where to apply their premium increases. For example, states could tell insurers to apply premiums to only Silver marketplace plans, all metal level plans inside and outside the marketplace, or all Silver plans inside and outside the marketplace. About 30 states assumed that CSR payments would not be disseminated and either encouraged or required states to increase premiums onto marketplace silver plans only. States that choose this option allows consumers in the marketplace to receive premium tax credits and consumers outside the marketplace to not experience any increase in premiums. Additionally, some legal scholars and health policy experts argue that states could pay for the premium themselves and then bill the federal government.

Legal Challenges

Eighteen states and the District of Columbia sued the Trump Administration seeking an immediate injunction to block President Trump from ending CSR payments to insurers. California federal judge, U.S. District Judge Vince Chhabria, denied the motion for an injunction.  Judge Chhabria argued that states had enough time to plan for the end of the cost-sharing payments and adjusted accordingly. Although Judge Chhabria has denied the injunction, California Attorney, General Xavier Becerra, will still proceed with the lawsuit.

Despite the Trump Administration’s attempt to unravel parts of the ACA, states and Congress are working to anticipate more downstream impacts and must act to find solutions or ways to mitigate the issues that will arise for low-income policy holders.

Stakeholders should anticipate a continuation of unstable markets as insurers will have to adjust their rates or leave the Exchanges if there are no changes made to fund CSR payments. State regulators will have to use creativity and flexible ways to help their constituents.

On November 1, 2017, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Service (“CMS”) released the Medicare Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System (“OPPS”) final rule (“Final Rule”), finalizing a Medicare payment reduction from Average Sales Price (“ASP”) + 6% to ASP – 22.5%, for 340B discounted drugs in the hospital outpatient setting, as was proposed in the OPPS proposed rule earlier this year. This payment reduction is effective January 1, 2018, and would primarily impact disproportionate share hospitals, rural referral centers, and non-rural sole community hospitals.

340B Program Generally

The 340B program, established by section 340B of the Public Health Service Act by the Veterans Health Care Act of 1992, generally allows for certain eligible health care providers (“Covered Entities”) to purchase outpatient drugs at discounted prices. The 340B program is administered by Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”).

CMS Policy Background for the Final Rule

In response to reports of the growth of 340B drug utilization by hospital providers, as well as the recent trends in high and growing prices of several separately payable drugs administered under Part B, CMS reexamined the appropriateness of the ASP +6% payment methodology to 340B drugs. This policy change as finalized would allow the Medicare program and beneficiaries to pay less for outpatient drugs, in a way that more closely aligns Medicare payment for 340B drugs to the resources expended by hospitals in acquiring such drugs. Additionally, CMS did not believe that beneficiaries should be responsible for a copayment rate tied to ASP + 6% when the actual cost to acquire the drug under the 340B program is much lower than the ASP for the drug.

340B Drug Payment Reduction

Under the Medicare program, CMS generally reimburses separately payable outpatient drugs and biologics based upon a drug’s ASP as reported by its manufacturer, plus a 6% markup, regardless of whether the drug is purchased at a 340B discount price. Drugs that are not separately payable are packaged into the payment for the associated procedure and no separate payment is made for them.

Effective January 1, 2018, CMS will reduce this payment rate to ASP – 22.5% for non-pass-through separately payable drugs and biologics acquired with a 340B discount. Excluded from this payment reduction are drugs or biologics that have pass-through payment status (which are required to be paid under the ASP + 6% methodology), or vaccines (which are excluded from the 340B program). In the proposed rule, CMS contemplated excluding blood clotting factors and radiopharmaceuticals from this payment reduction, however, CMS has decided to subject these two product types to the new policy. CMS noted that this ASP – 22.5% payment rate is based upon a 2015 MedPAC report in which MedPAC estimated that, on average, hospitals in the 340B Program “receive a minimum discount of 22.5 percent of the [ASP] for drugs paid under the [OPPS].”

Certain types of hospitals will not be affected by the change. CMS has exempted Covered Entities that are rural sole community hospitals, children’s hospitals, and cancer hospitals from this 340B drug payment reduction policy. Additionally, critical access hospitals are not affected by this policy because they are not paid under the OPPS. CMS has stated this payment reduction does not apply to 340B drugs furnished at non-excepted off-campus provider based departments.

To implement this payment reduction, CMS will be utilizing a claims modifier to track whether a drug is a 340B-acquired drug, and another claims modifier for whether the Covered Entity is exempt from this payment reduction policy. Hospitals will be required to report modifier “JG” with the associated nonpass-through separately payable drug’s HCPCS code to identify whether the drug was acquired with a 340B discount. The rural sole community hospitals, children’s hospitals, and cancer hospitals exempt from this payment reduction policy will be required to report the modifier “TB” with the associated HCPCS code of the 340B-acquired drug.

Additional Considerations

It is important to note that this new payment reduction policy generally does not apply to 340B drugs dispensed at contract pharmacies. Drugs reimbursed under the Medicare OPPS are generally physician administered drugs, whereas drugs dispensed at a contract pharmacy are generally self-administered retail drugs. Furthermore, this payment reduction policy does not affect 340B drug reimbursement for non-hospital Covered Entities, such as Federally Qualified Health Centers and Ryan White Grantees.

While HRSA manages the 340B program, this payment reduction is specifically for drugs reimbursed under the Medicare program. Accordingly, this policy does not affect reimbursement of 340B drugs by other government or private payers. However, it is possible that the Final Rule may embolden other payers to follow suit by adopting 340B payment reductions similar to CMS.

Organizations representing hospitals already have announced intent to take legal action against this 340B drug payment reduction. This legal action will likely focus on arguments that CMS exceeded its statutory authority in its ability to calculate and adjust 340B acquired drug payment rates, and doing so in a manner that discriminates against safety net hospitals violates the Medicare statutes.

The OPPS Final Rule will be published in the Federal Register on November 13, 2017 and available online at https://federalregister.gov/d/2017-23932. Epstein Becker & Green is available to provide guidance on how this new policy affects you.

On April 14, 2017, CMS issued the FY 2018 Medicare Hospital IPPS Proposed Rule that includes numerous proposed changes.   However, there is a very small provision in this proposed rule that organizations may not be aware of …. especially those that are not hospitals and who normally would not look at the Hospital IPPS rule.

Within the rule, there is a section proposing to revise the application and re-application process for Accrediting Organizations so as to require them to post provider/supplier survey reports and plans of corrections on their website.   Although the survey results are currently available through a number of other methods, CMS states that they are proposing AOs be required to post this information on their websites “in order to advance the Department’s and Agency’s commitment to transparency in terms of patient access to quality and safety information. Access to survey reports and PoCs will enable health care consumers, in addition to Medicare beneficiaries, to make a more informed decision regarding where to receive health care thus encouraging health care providers to improve the quality of care and services they provide.”

In my communications and discussions with several AOs and health care providers, many are concerned that a requirement that AOs post this information on their websites will not achieve the desired result of providing consumers with more transparency, but instead will merely provide what otherwise might be considered confusing information.   Specifically, it has been advanced that requiring AOs to post these reports on their websites will not support the intent to help the public but instead will:

  • Jeopardize the necessary confidentiality of quality improvement work that takes place between organizations and accrediting bodies through the private accreditation survey to ensure quality outcomes that are already public through accreditation decisions;  and
  • Not produce meaningful information for patients or the public beyond extensive data already available through CMS, departments of health, and many other entities that report information to the public appropriate to their scopes and roles, but instead create confusion for the public and patients seeking valid quality data on a healthcare organization.

Comments are due to CMS no later than 5:00 pm EST on June 13, 2017.

On March 15, 2017, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania issued an opinion that sheds insight on how courts view the “writing” requirement of various exceptions under the federal physician self-referral law (or “Stark Law”). The ruling involved the FCA qui tam case, United States ex rel. Emanuele v. Medicor Assocs., No. 1:10-cv-245, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36593 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2017), involving a cardiology practice (Medicor Associates, Inc.) and the Hamot Medical Center. The Court’s detailed discussion of the Stark Law in its summary judgment opinion provides guidance as to what may or may not constitute a “collection of documents” for purposes of satisfying a Stark Law exception.

This opinion is of particular note because it marks the first time that a physician arrangement has been analyzed since the Stark Law was most recently amended in November 2015, at which time the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) clarified and codified its longstanding interpretation of when the writing requirement is satisfied under various exceptions.

Arrangements Established by a “Collection of Documents”

Both the “professional services arrangement” and “fair market value” exceptions were potentially applicable, and require that the arrangement be “in writing” and signed. However, two of the medical directorships were not reduced to a formal written agreement. The Defendants identified the following collection of documents as evidence that the writing requirement was satisfied:

  • Emails regarding a general initiative between Hamot and Medicor for cardiac services, but without any specific information regarding directorship positions, duties or compensation.
  • Letter correspondence between Hamot and Medicor discussing the potential establishment of a director position for the women’s cardiac program.
  • Internal summary that identified a Medicor physician as the director of the women’s cardiac program.
  • Unsigned draft Agreement for Medical Supervision and Direction of the Women’s Cardiac Services Program.
  • A one page letter appointing a Medicor physician as the CV Chair and identifying a three-year term that expired June 30, 2008.

The Court said that although “these kinds of documents may generally be considered in determining whether the writing requirement is satisfied, it is essential that the documents outline, at an absolute minimum, identifiable services, a timeframe, and a rate of compensation.” (emphasis added). In addition, the Court noted that CMS requires that at least one of the documents in the collection be signed by each party. After confirming that these “critical” terms were missing from the documents described above, the Court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that either arrangement was set forth in writing in order to satisfy Stark’s fair market value exception or personal service arrangement exception.

Expired Arrangements

Other directorships were initially memorialized in signed, formal written contracts, but they all terminated pursuant to their terms on December 31, 2006 and were not formally extended or renewed in writing on or prior to their termination. Thereafter, Medicor continued to provide services and Hamot continued to make payments under the agreements. The parties eventually executed a series of “addendums” to extend the term of each arrangement, although these addenda had a prior effective date. During the timeframe between when the agreements expired and when the addenda were executed, invoices were continuously submitted and paid.

Plaintiff argued that the failure to execute timely written extensions in advance of renewals resulted in a failure of all six arrangements to meet the “writing” requirement under a relevant Stark Law exception. The Court disagreed, explaining that there is no requirement that the “writing” be a single formal agreement and CMS has provided guidance as to the type of collection of documents that could be considered when determining if the writing requirement is met at the time of the physician referral. In this case, the Defendants specifically relied upon the invoices from Medicor to Hamot and the checks that were sent in payment thereof.

In deciding that a reasonable jury could find that there was a sufficient collection of documents, the Court denied Plaintiff/Relator’s motion for summary judgment with respect to these six ‘expiring” directorships, and the case will proceed to trial on these claims.

Hospitals should carefully consider this opinion when auditing Stark Law compliance of their physician arrangements. A more detailed article analyzing this case will be published in the July edition of Compliance Today.

Congress is currently considering two bills that would dramatically alter the ways in which all federal agencies develop and publish rules. If enacted, both would create significant new obligations for agencies such as CMS and the FDA, expand the scope of judicial review of rules, and would increase the potential for political influence over the rulemaking process. Both bills passed the House on party-line votes, and are under consideration by the Senate.

The first bill, H.R. 5, would overhaul multiple phases of the federal rulemaking process. These proposed changes would make the rulemaking process significantly longer and more complex for agencies, and includes provisions that could prevent some rules from ever taking effect. The key provisions of the bill are summarized below:

  • Prior to publishing any rule (1) with an expected annual impact of $100 million or more, (2) that may reduce employment, or (3) that involves a novel legal or policy issue, an agency would have to publish an advance notice that it intends to publish a proposed notice of rulemaking, and must solicit comments on the notice. A proposed rule could only be published after this new additional process is complete.
  • Whenever an agency publishes a proposed rule for public comment in any of the categories described above, it would have to explain the basis for the rule, the data it relied on, and would have to explain the alternatives to the rule and justify why they were not adopted. In addition to the current public comment period, once a proposed rule was published an interested party could then request a hearing to contest the quality of the information relied on by the agency. Any resolution of this new step would slow down the rulemaking process further.
  • In all cases where a rule is expected to have an annual impact of at least $1 billion annually, the agency would now be required to conduct a public hearing limited to fact issues. This would add to the time and cost of publishing a new or revised rule.
  • When a final rule is published, the agency would be required to explain in the preamble to that rule why the rule will have the lowest possible cost unless it involves public health, safety, or welfare.
  • All agencies would be required to publish all documents considered by an agency prior to publishing the rule.  This would eliminate the deliberative process privilege that has been in place for decades, which is intended to promote the exchange of views within an agency, and may have a chilling effect on agency deliberation. In many cases, a final rule could not take effect until all of the information relied on by the agency had been made available electronically for at least six months unless the agency or the President claims an exception.
  • Recipients of federal funds would be prohibited from advocating for or against the rule, or appealing to the public to either support or oppose the rule.
  • Guidance documents issued by agencies, including manuals, circulars, and other subregulatory publications would no longer have any legal effect and could not be relied on by the agency for any actions. The bill does not explain how many important parts of federal programs, such as the administration of grants or cost accounting for hospitals in the Medicare program would be handled. These and other programs rely heavily on the detailed information found only in agency manuals and guidance. Without these guidelines, health care providers, suppliers, manufacturers, and researchers among others would find it increasingly difficult to comply with federal laws.

The bill would also make drastic changes in the scope of any judicial review of published agency rules. The bill would overturn the Supreme Court’s landmark Chevron decision, which established the principle that when an agency is charged with administering a statute and interprets ambiguous statutory language in a regulation, courts will defer to the agency’s permissible interpretation of the law. In its place, the bill would authorize courts to review all questions of law involving a regulation without giving weight to the agency’s experience or expertise. Courts would be empowered to impose their own constructions of the law on an agency, upending decades of precedents. This has the potential to increase federal courts’ dockets and place those courts in the position of reviewing technical information without all of the resources available to conduct a review. In addition, by allowing courts to decide cases without relying on the agency’s rationale, this increases the potential for inconsistent decisions and confusion among regulated entities such as health care providers, suppliers, and manufacturers seeking to comply with federal laws.

The second bill, H.R. 26, focuses more on expanding Congress’s control over the rulemaking process once an agency has completed the public notice and comment procedure under current law. It also expands the legislative veto over rules, which currently is authorized only when Congress disapproves of a rule and requires the President’s concurrence.

Under the bill, agencies would be required to report all new rules to Congress, and must identify all “major rules” as determined by the Office of Management and Budget that (1) will have an annual impact of $100M or more, (2) increases costs or prices, or (3) will have a significant impact on competition, employment, investment, or foreign trade. The report to Congress must also contain an analysis of the projected number or jobs that would be gained or lost as result of the rule. All major rules with the exception of those necessary for an emergency, enforcement of criminal laws, or to implement a trade agreement would not go into effect unless both houses of Congress approve the rule by a joint resolution within 70 legislative days after the agency submits its report. There is only one chance to obtain approval of a major rule during a session of Congress; if the joint resolution is not approved, or if no action is taken, the bill would bar Congress from considering a second resolution on the same rule during the same two-year session of Congress. This would allow Congress to override an agency and force the agency to begin the rulemaking anew, if at all. Congress would retain the authority to disapprove all other rules by a joint resolution. The bill also allows for judicial review of Congress’s actions only to review whether or not it followed the procedure in the statute; the merits of any action would be unreviewable.

In addition to expanding control over prospective rules, the bill would also add a sunset provision for existing rules. All agencies would be required to review current rules at least once every ten years and report to Congress; if Congress then failed to enact a joint resolution to retain the rules, they would be nullified.

Although the bills passed the House, it will be much harder for the Senate to pass them as well. Under Senate rules, 60 votes are required to end debate and bring the bills to a vote. Since the Republicans only hold 52 seats, they would need additional votes from Democrats in order for the bills to pass.

On October 24, 2016 the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) in conjunction with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) announced their intention to extend the Parallel Review pilot program indefinitely. The Parallel Review process is intended to provide timely feedback on clinical data requirements from FDA and CMS, and minimize the time required for receiving Medicare coverage nationally.  Sounds good.  So, why have so few manufacturers taken advantage of the program to date?

Despite its admirable goals, the current Parallel Review Process is too limited in scope and involves significant risks for manufacturers.

The standard process for obtaining Medicare coverage involves a sequential review. First, the device manufacturer must obtain approval, 510(k) clearance, or a de novo classification by the FDA.  After FDA approval, clearance, or de novo classification has been received, the manufacturer would seek coverage of the device or procedure using the device from CMS.  The manufacturer has the option of pursuing a National Coverage Determination (“NCD”) from CMS or a local coverage determination (“LCD”) from one or more of the Medicare Administrative Contractors (“MACs”).

In contrast, under the Parallel Review program, FDA and CMS simultaneously review manufacturer’s clinical trial design and data. Parallel Review is broken down into two stages: (1) the pivotal clinical trial design development stage, and (2) the concurrent evidentiary review stage. This two stage process is designed to allow manufacturers to minimize the likelihood of having to conduct additional trial(s) at a later date to meet CMS’s coverage requirements and shorten the overall timeline by having the agencies review the evidence simultaneously.  Although the goal is right, there are some disadvantages.

First, the Parallel Review program is limited to devices that are subject to pre-market approval or de novo classification. This is only a small portion of the market today. To put this in context, for every 140 510(k)s cleared by the FDA, one PMA is approved. In 2014, for example, there were 3203 510(k) clearances compared to only 42 PMAs and 28 de novo classifications. This means that the vast majority of devices will not be eligible for Parallel Review.

The more significant limitation is that the program requires the manufacturer to pursue a NCD. Deciding whether to pursue a NCD or LCD is a significant strategic consideration for any manufacturer.  Requiring that manufacturers apply for a NCD in the Parallel Review process  creates a high degree of risk that manufacturers – and their investors – may not be willing to take. As manufacturers are painfully aware, if CMS issues an unfavorable NCD, Medicare coverage is not available anywhere in the US. Because NCDs apply nationally to all MACs, the LCD option is foreclosed by an unfavorable NCD. Manufacturers can appeal, of course. But reopening an adverse NCD requires a significant amount of new data that may take years to compile through new clinical trials and there is no guarantee that a reopening will be granted or a favorable NCD will be published.  As a result, the lack of a choice between NCDs and LCDs can be a powerful deterrent to the Parallel Review program.

This risk is compounded by the fact that manufacturers are not allowed to drop out of the NCD process after the NCD tracking sheet has been publicly posted by CMS. Although the program is designed to provide early feedback, it is not unusual for CMS to have additional comments throughout the NCD process. Under the current Parallel Review process, manufacturers would be required to pursue NCDs even if they later received new information that made the NCD pathway less desirable.

It is also unclear if the program is appropriately resourced. The Parallel Review Pilot Program was limited to no more than five candidates per year. If the Agencies are serious about accelerating the path to market and payment for even this subcategory of devices, they need to allow more devices into the program and ensure that it is appropriately staffed to adequately address the needs of the participants.

While the Parallel Review program has its challenges, it is a step in the right direction. It just does not go far enough.  In order to have a more predictable and streamlined path to market, manufacturers need clear guidance on coverage criteria that can be leveraged nationally or locally.  Moreover, this guidance should apply to any device that required clinical evidence for coverage, regardless of whether the device is subject to a PMA, de novo or 510(k) clearance.

By focusing on broad based improvements to the coverage determination process, the Agencies would be able to provide patients with access to more devices more quickly using less Agency resources. If, for example, the time frame for the NCD and LCD process could be reduced by 20 days on average by providing more transparent guidance, and if you could apply that to half of the products that received approval, de novo classification, or clearance in 2014, that would save over 32,000 days of review time.  Admittedly, that is spread out over time and among manufacturers but the impact is not insubstantial.

FDA’s expansion of its program to include the opportunity to get feedback from private payors is also a positive development for manufacturers.   While it is still too early to know the impact of this program, commercial payors are another key piece of any manufacturer’s commercial strategy and must be considered early.

The decision to make the Parallel Review Program permanent no doubt reflects a commitment by FDA and CMS to working with manufacturers to help bring new devices to market in a faster and more efficient way.   However, opportunities remain to improve the program to expedite the process in a way that benefits industry – and patients – more broadly.

Health care providers, life sciences companies and other entities subject to regulation by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) or the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) should be aware that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) is increasing the maximum civil monetary penalty amounts that may be assessed by the agency.

The new maximum adjusted penalty amounts may have a significant impact on entities that violate or fail to meet mandatory reporting requirements set by FDA or CMS. Of the 299 enumerated increased fines, 137 fines (45.8%) have increased by over 75%, 100 fines (33.4%) increased by over 97%, and 64 fines (21.4%) have doubled or more.  These increased fines affect a wide variety of activities and providers illustrated by the following examples:

Fine Previous Penalty New, Increased Penalty
Fines for failure to report drug samples required by 21 U.S.C. § 353(d)(3)(E) $100,000 per instance $197,869 per instance
Fines for participating in prohibited conduct under 21 U.S.C. § 331 (misbranding, unapproved alteration, use of counterfeits, and other conduct related to the use of drugs or devices) $1,000,000 $1,781,560
Fines for any related series of violations of requirements relating to electronic products under 21 U.S.C. § 360pp(b)(1) $375,000 $937,500
Improper billing fines for Hospitals, critical access hospitals, or skilled nursing facilities under 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(g) $2,000 $5,000
Fines for certain biological product recall violations under 42 U.S.C. § 262(d) $100,000 $215,628
Fines to Medicaid MCOs that improperly expel or refuse to reenroll a beneficiary under 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(m)(5)(B)(i) $100,000 $197,869
Fines for failure to report medical malpractice claims, or breaching confidentiality of information within such a claim, to the National Practitioner Data Bank under 42 U.S.C. § 11131(b)(2)-(c) $10,000 $21,563
Skilled Nursing Facility fines for noncompliance under 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(h)(2)(B)(ii)(l) $10,000 $20,628
Fines for failure to promptly provide appropriate diagnosis codes to CMS under 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(p)(3)(A) $2,000 $3,957
Daily fines for failure by a home health agency to be in compliance with statutory requirements per 42 U.S.C. § 1395bbb(f)(2)(A)(i) $10,000 $19,787

The adjusted civil monetary penalty amounts became effective on September 6, 2016, and are applicable only to HHS civil penalties assessed after August 1, 2016 for violations that occurred after November 2, 2015.  Pursuant to the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (“2015 Act”) and the Administrative Procedures Act (5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B)), HHS finalized the interim rule without prior notice or comment period.  As the 2015 Act provided a straight forward formula to calculate future civil monetary penalty adjustments, HHS determined that there was good cause for immediate implementation without a notice and comment period.

While penalties that more than double their previous amounts may be alarming, a penalty increase is not surprising considering some penalties have remained unchanged since 1968.[1]  These increases represent only the initial “catch up” adjustments required by the 2015 Act.  Similar to the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Railroad Retirement Board penalty increase adjustments for the False Claims Act discussed previously, HHS must also make subsequent annual civil monetary penalty adjustments for inflation by January 15 each  year. These increased penalties, along with the anticipated yearly inflation adjustments, provide companies with additional incentives to increase their compliance efforts in the hope of limiting their exposure to additional penalties.

[1] For example, 21 U.S.C. 360pp(b)(1) increased the penalty for any person who violated requirements for electronic products 150% from its pre-inflation penalty, from $1,100 per unlawful act or omission pre-adjustment to $2,750 per act or omission post-adjustment.

If your organization has missed an opportunity to participate in the voluntary Medicare Bundled Payments for Care Initiatives and/or the mandatory CJR program, CMS’ Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation has issued a proposed rule introducing three new mandatory Episode Payment Models (EPMs) and a Cardiac Rehabilitation incentive payment model intended to be tested with a broad scope of hospitals which may not have otherwise participated in innovative payment model testing.

In the proposed rule issued August 2, 2016, CMS introduced EPMs for Acute Myocardial infarction (AMI), Coronary Surgery Bypass Graft (CABG) and Surgical Hip/Femur Fracture Treatment- Excluding Lower Joint Replacement (SHFFT) and a Cardiac Rehabilitation incentive model to be tested for five performance years, beginning July 1, 2017 and continuing through December 31, 2021. CMS estimates Medicare savings of $170 million over the five-year test period.

These new EPMs were selected to compliment care episodes addressed in other voluntary BPCI models and the mandatory Comprehensive Joint Replacement program with different patient populations due to the clinical conditions and non-elective treatment nature of the episodes chosen. As the clinical characteristics of these EPMs include both planned and unplanned treatment needs and underlying chronic conditions, the EPMs will be tested over a broader and complementary array of hospitals and MSA regions, to further promote care redesign models that focus on coordination and alignment of care in a largely fragmented acute to post acute care spectrum. It is hoped that with testing these new EPMs and the Cardiac Rehabilitation incentive model with a broader scope of hospitals with aligned post-acute providers will promote the rapid development of evidence-based knowledge CMS is striving to obtain.

These AMI, CABG and SHFFT EPMs were selected due to the high volume of these procedures among beneficiaries with common chronic conditions, such as cardiovascular disease, which contribute to the episode and impact high readmission rates. With these EPMs, CMMI is furthering its goals of testing innovative payment models to reduce cost and improve care transition efficiencies and long term outcomes throughout the care continuum. The same quality measures applied to Comprehensive Joint Replacement will be applied to SHFFT. The Cardiac Rehabilitation incentive model is designed to encourage treatment, reduce barriers to high –value care and increase utilization of cardiac rehabilitation and intensive cardiac services which have been shown to improve long term outcomes, but appear to be underutilized. (For example, CMS estimates that 35% of AMI patients older than 50 receive cardiac rehabilitation services). The Cardiac Rehabilitation incentive payment will be made to the selected hospitals with AMI and CABG EPMs for cardiac rehabilitation services provided during the EPM as they are already engaging in managing such episodes.

The EPM episodes will begin with acute admission at an anchor hospital for the applicable MS-DRG for the EPM upon discharge, and continue for 90- day period post discharge. Similar to CJR , acute care hospitals bear the financial risk for AMI, CABG and SHFFT EPMS, which include the inpatient admission(s), all related Medicare Part A and B services, including hospital, post-acute and physician services within the 90-day period. Eligible beneficiaries admitted to the anchor hospital for the applicable EPM will automatically be included within the applicable EPM. Hospitals and providers will be paid under Medicare FFS and after the first performance year, calculation of the actual episode payments will be reconciled against an established historical EPM quality adjusted target. Hospitals will bear upside and downside risk for the episodes after performance year two. The Cardiac Rehabilitation incentive will be paid to AMI and CABG EPM hospitals at a per cardiac rehabilitation/ intensive cardiac rehabilitation service level based on threshold treatments provided per AMI/ CABG episode post discharge.

While complementing current BPCI and CRJ programs, CMS is addressing potential advantages and disadvantages to certain overlapping of programs, geographic regions (MSAs) and hospitals. For example, acute care hospitals participating in BPCI Models 2 and 4 for hip and femur procedures and for all three BPCI cardiac episodes (AMI, PCI and CABG) will not be included for selection for the new EPMs. SHFFT EPMs will be implemented in the same 67 geographic MSAs where the CJR model is currently implemented. AMI and CABG EPMs will be implemented together in 98 MSAs selected based on specific criteria to avoid overlap with other payment initiatives such as BPCI models and AMI/ CABG procedure volumes.

Hospitals and certain ACOs may share gains with other providers under the AMI, CABG and SHFFT models as EPM collaborators. Similar to other model programs, the adoption of certain waivers are also proposed, such as adopting waivers of the telehealth originating and geographic site requirements and allowing for in-home telehealth visits for the three EPMs; EPM-specific limits for post-discharge home nursing visits and the SNF 3-day stay waiver, and expanding the practitioners allowed to perform certain cardiac rehabilitation services. Hospitals’ aligning with post acute providers and programs to effectively manage their EPM patients’ post acute transition and treatment adherence and monitoring will be critical to the EPM program success.

The selected MSAs and hospitals will be announced with the publication of the final rule. CMS is requesting public comment on the proposed rule and on any alternatives considered, by October 3, 2016.

On July 7, 2016, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) imposed several administrative penalties on Theranos, a clinical laboratory company that proposed to revolutionize the clinical laboratory business by performing multiple blood tests using a few drops of blood drawn from a finger rather than from a traditional blood draw that relies on needles and tubes. However, after inspecting the laboratory, CMS concluded that the company failed to comply with federal law and regulations governing clinical laboratories and it posed an immediate jeopardy to patient health and safety. CMS has revoked the CLIA certification of the company’s California lab, imposed a civil monetary penalty of $10,000 per day until all deficiencies are corrected, barred Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement for its services, and excluded its founder and CEO from owning or operating a clinical laboratory for two years.

Although Theranos’s history has received an outsize amount of media attention, its experience with regulatory agencies highlights several important issues for start-up and emerging health care entities:

What Do Regulators Want?

It is no surprise that health care is one of the most highly regulated sectors of the U.S. economy, and that noncompliance with health care laws and regulations can result in penalties that can cripple an organization or force it to shut down. As a result, even in an environment that encourages innovation, health care organizations must understand the scope of regulatory oversight at the federal and state levels, and the range of remedies available to regulators for noncompliance. Every organization should also have a protocol in place for responding to regulatory inquiries or inspections.

What Do Health Care Providers and Payors Want?

Adopting a new health care technology is an intensely data-driven process. This is especially the case with clinical laboratories, which are subject to rigorous requirements for proficiency, quality assurance, and training. This burden is greater for laboratory-developed tests, commonly known as “home brew” tests, because they are currently exempt from FDA oversight.

In most cases, the innovator sponsors clinical studies subject to peer review and publication to demonstrate the efficacy of the new technology. These trials can also generate the clinical and cost data needed to convince practitioners that the test has reliable diagnostic or clinical value, and to persuade payors that the test is medically necessary.

However, Theranos declined requests to sponsor studies or disclose data. This was a red flag for many clinicians. In the interim, a group of independent investigators published a study based on a small sample of patients and found that the Theranos’s results were more variable than the results obtained from the same blood samples sent to laboratories using standard equipment. These variations were significant enough that they had the potential to affect clinical decision-making and jeopardize patients.

Who Is Investing in the Venture?

For start-up companies, committed investors are indispensable. Although early-stage investors are accustomed to risk, they also depend on reliable data to gauge whether health care professionals will adopt a new technology, and whether health plans will cover and pay for that technology. In Theranos’s case, several investors with experience in health care start-ups did not invest in the company because it did not release data on its proprietary technology and did not conduct or sponsor well-controlled clinical trials.

Who’s on Board?

The critical role of health care regulations demands that a company’s management and board be familiar with the key challenges and potential barriers to entry under the applicable regulatory framework. Nevertheless, at the time of the CMS survey Theranos’s board reportedly lacked individuals with specific experience in health care operations or clinical laboratories; however, it included two former Secretaries of State (one of whom had also been the dean of a business school), two former U.S. senators, the CEO of a bank, and retired military officers. While it is unclear how much the board knew of potential regulatory risks, the fact that CMS determined that the company had not made a “credible allegation of compliance” in response to any of the deficiencies in the initial survey report is an indicator that CMS did not believe that the company’s management and directors may not have appreciated the regulatory requirements or how to avoid or minimize these significant risks.

Epstein-Becker-Green-ClientAlertHCLS_gif_pagespeed_ce_KdBznDCAW4In February 2012, two years after the passage of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) issued a proposed rule, which was subject to significant public comment, concerning reporting and returning certain Medicare overpayments (“Proposed Rule”). On February 12, 2016, four years from the issuance of the Proposed Rule (and six years after passage of the ACA), CMS issued the final rule, which becomes effective on March 14, 2016 (“A and B Final Rule”).

The A and B Final Rule applies only to providers and suppliers under Medicare Parts A and B. The return of overpayments under Medicare Parts C and D are addressed in a final rule that was published by CMS in May 2014 (“C and D Final Rule”). To date, no final regulations have been adopted that address Medicaid requirements.

Among other things, the A and B Final Rule and its preamble provide:

  • a six-year lookback period;
  • that providers and suppliers must exercise “reasonable diligence” in connection with identifying potential overpayments;
  • that the time period to conduct “reasonable diligence” should be no more than six months, except in extraordinary circumstances; and
  • that “identification” includes quantifying the amount of the overpayment.

Kirsten M. Backstrom, George B. Breen, Anjali N.C. Downs, David E. Matyas, and Meghan F. Weinberg coauthored a Health Care and Life Sciences Client Alert that addresses a number of the significant provisions of the A and B Final Rule, describes an important difference between the two final rules, and sets forth a list of nine key “takeaways” that we believe all Medicare providers and suppliers should be aware of.

Click here to read the full Health Care and Life Sciences Client Alert.