On November 2, 2018 CMS announced the finalization of the 2019 OPPS and ASC payment rules which were initially proposed in July of 2018.[1] [2] While the final document will not be officially published until November 21st, an Inspection Copy is available for the public to review on the Federal Register website. These new payment rules in many ways expand the range of services that CMS will reimburse when performed at Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASCs), most notably, by including certain cardiac catheterization procedures on the approved list, and by lowering the threshold that determines allowable device intensive procedures.

Increase in Covered Cardiac Catheterization Procedures:

The Final Rule will add 17 procedures relating to cardiac catheterization to the list of ASC Covered Surgical Procedures.  The final list includes five procedures that were not included in the July 2018 proposed rule, due in part to commenters requesting that additional procedures be added to the list, and CMS adopting their request, at least in part.[3] [4] [5] The expanded list reflects the growing trend of cardiac procedures being transitioned from an inpatient to an outpatient setting. This shift will have a continuing business impact on inpatient providers and may also lead to state-level regulatory changes. States that currently prohibit cardiac catheterization procedures at outpatient facilities may decide to adopt changes to allow certain procedures that have been deemed acceptable by CMS to be performed at facilities without on-site inpatient services, including ASCs.[6] Furthermore, these additions could be a springboard for CMS to later add more complicated procedures to the list of ASC covered services.

Decrease in Device Offset Percentage:

CMS has also taken steps to make device-intensive procedures more accessible in the ASC setting. Procedures categorized as “device-intensive” are paid at the higher OPPS rate, even if performed in an ASC.  However, a procedure only qualifies as “device-intensive” if the portion of the procedure’s cost related to the device falls within a predetermine percentage. The Final Rule decreases the device offset percentage threshold from 40 percent to 30 percent, meaning that procedures utilizing lower-cost devices will now be eligible for reimbursement as “device-intensive.”  As a result, ASCs will have the financial capacity to perform more procedures that involve lower cost medical devices.[7] CMS directly states its purpose behind this move saying “We believe allowing these additional procedures to qualify for device-intensive status will help ensure these procedures receive more appropriate payment in the ASC setting, which will help encourage the provision of these services in the ASC setting.”[8] The implementation of the new payment rules will undoubtedly lead to an increase in the amount of device-intensive procedures performed in the ASC setting as ASCs expand their scope of services to include more device-intensive procedures and patients choose to have these procedures performed in an outpatient setting. This change may also indicate future moves by CMS to encourage complex, device intensive procedures, such as joint replacements, in the ASC setting.

Government Shift to Outpatient Providers

These rule changes reflect Medicare’s continued shift towards encouraging services to be provided in the less costly outpatient setting. Anticipating a continued incline in the amount of individuals eligible for federal programs based on the expectation that 10,000 baby boomers will retire per day for over the next decade, CMS is likely to continue making changes to its payment rules to encourage the provision of care in lower cost settings.[9] These changes provide opportunities for ASCs and physicians to expand their business, but also threaten more “bread and butter” revenue streams on which hospitals have historically relied. Thus, hospitals, ASCs and physicians should consider addressing these changes in their long-term strategic plans, including possible joint ventures for outpatient services, in general, or specific service lines, such as cardiac catheterizations.

____

[1] CMS Inspection Copy

[2] 83 Fed. Reg. 37046.

[3] CMS Inspection Copy (at page 746)

[4] 83 Fed. Reg. 37046, 37160.

[5] CMS Inspection Copy (at page 743-44)

[6] N.J.A.C. 8:33E-1.3.

[7] 83 Fed. Reg. 37046, 37108.

[8] Id.

[9] http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2010/12/29/baby-boomers-retire/

Massachusetts employers with six or more employees are required to annually submit the new Health Insurance Responsibility Disclosure (“HIRD”) form, regardless of whether they offer health insurance to their employees or not. The Massachusetts Department of Revenue (DOR) recently issued guidance on the new HIRD reporting requirements. An individual is considered to be an employee if the employer has included such individual in the quarterly wage report to the Department of Unemployment Assistance during the past 12 months. The new HIRD form only consists of a single employer form, which only needs to be completed once annually. The old HIRD form consisted of an employer form and an employee form, which required separate forms completed and signed by each employee who declined to enroll in employer-sponsored insurance (“ESI”) or the Employer’s Section 125 Cafeteria Plan to pay for health insurance.

To file your HIRD form, login to your MassTaxConnect (“MTC”) withholding account and select the “File health insurance responsibility disclosure” hyperlink under the account alerts. The HIRD reporting period will be available to be filed starting November 1 of the filing year, and must be completed by November 30. Thereafter, HIRD reporting will be due on November 30 of each subsequent year.  Although HIRD may be completed by your payroll company, it is the employer’s responsibility to ensure compliance and timely filing.  The HIRD form collects employer-level information about your company’s health plan offerings and does not collect any personal information about employees.  The form will assist MassHealth in identifying its members with access to qualifying ESI who may be eligible for the MassHealth Premium Assistance Program.

On October 25, 2018, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) to solicit feedback on its newly proposed International Pricing Index (IPI) model for Medicare Part B drug reimbursement.  The IPI model will be tested by the CMS Innovation Center as a potential means to dismantle and replace the current buy-and-bill model and advance the Trump Administration’s agenda for drug pricing reform, as described in its May 2018 Blueprint to Lower Drug Prices and Reduce Out-of-Pocket Costs.  The framework of the IPI model is characterized by three components designed to achieve the following objectives:

  • Utilize private sector vendors to purchase and take title (but not necessarily possession) over single source drugs and biologicals (including biosimilars) and bill Medicare.  The vendors would then have flexibility to offer a variety of delivery options to ordering physicians.  This concept, which was inspired by Medicare Part D’s use of competing private-sector companies to facilitate the provision of Medicare-covered items and supplies, would leverage and improve upon the Competitive Acquisition Program (CAP) previously implemented in the mid-2000s.
  • Phase in, over a five-year period, a reduced Medicare payment for selected drugs based on a composite of international prices.  CMS would reimburse vendors for drugs purchased from manufacturers based on international pricing (except where the ASP is lower), as benchmarked against more than a dozen other nations with economies comparable to the United States that have significantly lower acquisition costs for physician-administered drugs.
  • Replace the percentage-based Part B add-on payment (i.e., ASP+6% (ASP+4.3% post-sequestration)) with a set payment amount, which would be based on 6% of a Part B drug’s historical drug costs.  Under the new model, physicians would continue to receive payment for drug administration.  Because physicians would be obtaining drugs from vendors, and no longer assuming financial risk, the add-on payment would be decreased to remove physicians’ incentive to prescribe higher cost drugs but be calibrated to hold providers harmless to the extent possible.

CMS plans to issue a proposed rule fully describing the IPI model in Spring 2019, with the goal of testing the model over a five-year period, from Spring 2020 to Spring 2025.  The IPI model would involve selected Part B-covered single source drugs and biologicals (including biosimilars) and would apply to all physician practices and hospital outpatient departments (HOPDs) in certain designated geographic areas.  Providers, beneficiaries, and drugs not included in the model will remain under the current Medicare Part B reimbursement system.

The ANPRM signals the Administration’s determination to dramatically overhaul the Medicare Part B drug reimbursement system through a new competitive acquisition program based on international pricing that would seek to reduce government and beneficiary costs while keeping providers revenue neutral.  While CMS appears committed to the general outlines of the IPI model, it has invited industry feedback on a wide range of matters pertaining to the configuration and details of each of the model’s components as well as certain quality measures that CMS will consider in assessing the impact of the model on beneficiary access and quality of care.  Stakeholders have until December 31, 2018 to submit comments on the ANPRM.

Epstein Becker Green (EBG) will be closely analyzing the proposed IPI model and related developments while working with its clients to assess its impact and formulate and advance new ideas to shape the model and its future implementation.

Recent comments by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Commissioner Rohit Chopra should have companies on notice for increased enforcement actions across the board. During the “Privacy. Security. Risk.” Conference in Texas last week, Chopra made comments regarding his views on increasing enforcement, including the imposition of greater civil monetary penalties. “I’ve already raised concerns about settlements we do with no monetary penalties. I want to see monetary consequences for egregious breaking of the law” said Chopra as reported by the IAPP during a live podcast taping. Chopra also stated that he was troubled by current federal enforcement action in the United States, the answer to which appears in part to come with heftier fines.

While the FTC hopes to have a bigger bite, it appears that Congressional action, or lack thereof, is in many ways muzzling the agency. During a House Subcommittee hearing in July, FTC officials indicated that while they were aggressively pursuing action regarding data and privacy security, they also said that their hands were tied in regard to bringing more aggressive enforcement. As stated by Chairman Joe Simmons, “In my view, we need more authority. I support data security legislation that would give us three things: (1) the ability to seek civil penalties to effectively deter unlawful conduct, (2) jurisdiction over non-profits and common carriers, and (3) the authority to issue implementing rules under the Administrative Procedure Act. And we should consider additional privacy authority as well….” In part, Chairman Simmons may be referencing Congress’s failure to pass a comprehensive data protection law, particularly in the shadow of the European Union’s GDPR standards, which are continuing to impact American companies.

These comments come at a time where companies face ever increasing risk as the economy becomes more and more data-centric. Across the country, companies and their boards are faced with an ever more complex business decision on how to make cyber-security make business sense. On the one hand, investing in a robust cyber-security program, both in terms of designing a compliance strategy and investing in technology, is balanced with the risk and cost of a data breach. While the risks appear to be increasing, the cost of such a breach may also be increasing as well. In addition to a loss of revenue due to a drop in consumer confidence, Chairman Simmons and Commissioner Chopra’s comments should make companies aware that enforcement and increased civil monetary penalties may also be more of a threat towards business’s bottom lines.

On October 15, 2018, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) unveiled its proposed rule requiring direct-to-consumer television advertisements for prescription drug and biological products to contain the list price (defined as the Wholesale Acquisition Cost) if the product is reimbursable by Medicare or Medicaid. Medical devices are not included in the proposed rule, although CMS seeks comment on how advertised drugs should be treated if used in combination with a non-advertised device. If finalized, the requirement will be sweeping and only purports to exclude products costing under $35 per month for a 30-day supply or a typical course of treatment.

CMS prescribes specific language for manufacturers to use at the end of an advertisement:

The list price for a [30-day supply of ] [typical course of treatment with] [name of prescription drug or biological product] is [insert list price]. If you have health insurance that covers drugs, your cost may be different.

The list price is determined “on the first day of the quarter during which the advertisement is being aired or otherwise broadcast.” This pricing statement must be legible, “placed appropriately against a contrasting background for sufficient duration,” and must be in an easily read font and size. Manufacturers are permitted under the proposed rule, “[t]o the extent permissible under current laws,” to include a competitor’s current product list price, so long as the disclosure is done in a “truthful, non-misleading way.”

CMS proposes that drug and biological products in violation of the proposed rule would be publically listed on its website. Although CMS acknowledged that it was proposing no other HHS-specific enforcement mechanisms, CMS anticipates an influx in private actions under the Lanham Act as the primary enforcement mechanism if the proposed rule is finalized.

Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar emphasized the proposed rule’s intent to mitigate consumer out-of-pocket costs and reduce unnecessary Medicare and Medicaid expenditures. Interested stakeholders can submit comments online to the regulations.gov docket or by mail until December 17, 2018.

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (“CMS”) recently announced its intent to expand what may be considered “supplemental benefits,” broadening the scope of items and services that could be offered to Medicare Advantage (“MA”) plan enrollees over and above the benefits covered under original Medicare. However, in articulating the standards for covering this broadened group of items and services, CMS proposed a new requirement that could greatly limit enrollees’ ability to access all types of supplemental benefits and increase the already substantial burden on MA participating providers; CMS now proposes to require that the supplemental benefits be ordered by a licensed provider.

Under current CMS guidance, supplemental benefits may not be a Part A or Part B covered service, must be primarily health related in that “the primary purpose of the item or service is to prevent, cure or diminish an illness or injury,” and the plan sponsor must incur a non-zero cost for the benefit. Medicare Managed Care Manual, Ch. 4, Sec. 30.1. Within the draft 2019 Call Letter, released on February 1, 2018, CMS proposes to expand the scope of items and services considered “primarily health related” to now include items and services to help maintain health status and not only those that “prevent, cure or diminish illness or injury.” According to CMS, under its new interpretation, in order for a service or item to be primarily health related “it must diagnose, prevent, or treat an illness or injury, compensate for physical impairments, act to ameliorate the functional psychological impact of injuries or health conditions, or reduce avoidable emergency and healthcare utilization.” Current CMS guidance explicitly excludes from being a supplemental benefit those items or services which are solely for daily maintenance purposes.  CMS’s broadened definition follows medical and health care research studies which have shown the value of certain ‘maintenance’ items and services in diminishing the effects of injuries or health conditions and decreasing avoidable emergency and health care services.

While broadening the scope of items and services eligible to be considered supplemental benefits, CMS concurrently proposes to add a more stringent standard to an enrollee’s receipt of such benefits. “Supplemental benefits under this broader interpretation must be medically appropriate and ordered by a licensed provider as part of a care plan if not directly provided by one.” Although current guidance specifies medical necessity as a standard for supplemental benefits that extend the coverage of original Medicare, there is no requirement that supplemental benefits be ordered by a licensed provider. Depending upon the nature of the supplemental benefit, such a rule could prevent an enrollee from accessing certain benefits. For example, plan sponsors may provide acupuncture or other alternative therapies as supplemental benefits, but enrollees would only be able to access such services if their provider accepts the value of such services and agrees that they are medically necessary. Given that many in traditional medicine do not support the use of alternative therapies, it is likely that at least some enrollees will be unable to access these benefits under this newly proposed standard.  Also, requiring a provider to review and order other types of supplemental benefits would likely create a paperwork burden with no benefit, including, for example, with respect to a supplemental transportation benefit, fitness benefit or over-the-counter drug benefit.

Although CMS should be applauded for seeking to expand the definition of “health related” in identifying eligible supplemental benefits, its proposal to require that such benefits be ordered by a provider as part of a treatment plan will decrease plan flexibility and increase burden for providers and enrollees alike, with minimal benefit.

CMS is accepting comments on the draft Call Letter through 6pm EST, Monday March 5, 2018.

Over the past week, the White House administration (the “Administration”) has issued two documents addressing drug pricing. First, on February 9, 2018, the White House’s Council of Economic Advisers released a white paper titled “Reforming Biopharmaceutical Pricing at Home and Abroad” (the “White Paper”).  Second, on February 12, 2018, the Administration issued its 2019 Budget Proposal (“2019 Budget”).

Whereas the recommendations set forth in the White Paper are more conceptual or exploratory, the 2019 Budget purportedly reflects the Administration’s more specific priorities for 2019. The developments are significant because, after outspoken pledges to reduce drug prices over a year ago, the White Paper and the 2019 Budget, taken together, are the Administration’s first attempt to set forth its drug pricing policy framework.

FY 2019 Budget Proposal Outline

The Administration’s 2019 Budget proposes strategies to address drug pricing reform in several areas.

  • Medicaid: The 2019 Budget proposes for new Medicaid demonstration authority to allow five states to test drug coverage and financing reform. Under this demonstration, instead of participating in the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, these states would determine their own drug formularies and negotiate drug prices directly with manufacturers, with the resulting negotiated prices being exempt from Best Price.
  • Medicare Part B: With respect to the Medicare program, the 2019 Budget provides several proposals. First, the 2019 Budget would require all manufacturers of Part B drugs to report average sales price (“ASP”) data, and to penalize those who do not report ASP data. Additionally, the 2019 Budget proposes to limit the increase in ASP-based drug payment to the annual rate of inflation. For drugs reimbursed based on wholesale acquisition cost (“WAC”) rather than ASP, the 2019 Budget proposes to reduce this payment rate from 106% of WAC down to 103% of WAC. The 2019 Budget also proposes to modify reimbursement to hospitals for drugs acquired at 340B discounts by rewarding hospitals that provide charity care, and reducing payments to hospitals that provide little to no charity care. The 2019 Budget proposes to consolidate certain drugs covered under Part B into Part D coverage.
  • Medicare Part D: For beneficiaries enrolled in Part D plans, the 2019 Budget proposes to establish an out-of-pocket maximum in the catastrophic coverage phase, eliminate cost-sharing for generic drugs for low-income seniors, and permanently authorize a Part D demonstration that provides retroactive and point-of-sale coverage to certain low-income patients.
  • FDA: The 2019 Budget proposes to give the FDA greater ability to bring generics to market more quickly. If a first-to-file generic application is not yet approved due to deficiencies, the 2019 Budget proposes to allow the FDA to tentatively approve a subsequent generic application rather than waiting for the first-to-file application to amend its application deficiencies.

Council of Economic Advisers White Paper

The White Paper discusses options for drug pricing reforms that would impact Medicaid, Medicare, the 340B drug discount program, and FDA. The following provides a summary of the major ideas proposed in the White Paper:

  • Medicaid: The White Paper contends that the determination of Best Price on a single unit of drug under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program operates as an inducement to manufacturers to inflate commercial prices. The White Paper posits that CMS could revise the applicable rules for Best Price without conflicting with the statutory language, such that Best Price could be determined post-sale based on “the patient’s recovery”, i.e., the health outcome or effectiveness of the drug. The White Paper suggests that more clarity from CMS on value-based contracting would encourage drug purchasers to negotiate for lower prices.
  • Medicare Part B: With respect to drugs reimbursable under Medicare Part B, the White Paper focuses on expensive specialty drugs and biologics administered by physicians. The White Paper contends that due to the cost-plus reimbursement methodology under Medicare Part B (ASP plus 6 per cent), physicians do not have incentives to prescribe cheaper medications to control costs. The White Paper cites solutions proposed by MedPAC and other government agencies to realign incentives including: (i) introducing physician reimbursement that is not tied to drug prices, (ii) moving Medicare Part B drug coverage into Medicare Part D, where price-competition over drug prices is better structured, and (iii) changing how pricing data is reported to increase transparency.
  • Medicare Part D: The White Paper scrutinizes the Part D program as being structured in a manner that prevents pricing competition and causes “perverse incentives.” Specifically, the White Paper suggests that Part D’s requirement to cover at least two non-therapeutically equivalent products within each class and category prevents Part D sponsors from competitively negotiating lower prices and that the prohibition of formulary tier-based cost-sharing for low income beneficiaries creates a disincentive to use “high value” rather than high cost drugs. In addition, the White Paper states that since the 50% discount drug manufacturers are required to provide during the coverage gap is applied to the patient’s true out-of-pocket costs, enrollees have an incentive to use high cost drugs while in the coverage gap.In addition to making the specific observations above, the White Paper cites more general options proposed by MedPAC, OIG and other government agencies to address “misaligned incentives”: (i) requiring plans to share drug manufacturer discounts with patients, (ii) allowing plans to manage formularies to negotiate better prices for patients, (iii) lowering co-pays for generic drugs for patients; and (iv) discouraging plan formulary design that speeds patients to the catastrophic coverage phase of benefit and increases overall spending.
  • 340B Drug Discount Program: The White Paper posits that there are two significant issues with the 340B Program. The first is “imprecise eligibility criteria has allowed for significant program growth beyond the intended purpose of the program.” The second is the use of program revenue for purposes other than providing care for low-income patients, which is what the Administration believes was originally intended. While not providing specifics, the White Paper suggests establishing “more precise” eligibility criteria as an alternative to the DSH percentage currently used to establish hospital eligibility, and requiring that the 340B discount more directly benefit poor patient populations.
  • FDA: The White Paper suggests modifying the existing FDA criteria for expedited review to include new molecular entities that are second or third in a class, or second or third for a given indication for which there are no generic competitors. The White Paper states that this would reduce the time period a particular drug would be able to benefit from a higher price before facing generic competition. The White Paper also suggests policies aimed at reducing the cost of innovation, including having the FDA continue to facilitate the validation and qualification of new drug development tools that allow manufacturers to demonstrate safety and efficacy more efficiently and earlier, and speeding up the issuance of FDA final guidelines to add certainty and attract additional biosimilar applicants to the marketplace.
  • Pharmacy Benefit Managers: The White Paper scrutinizes the PBM industry as having “outsized profits” due to the high concentration of the PBM market (3 PBMs account for 85% of the market) and criticizes the lack of transparency with respect to the rebates that PBMs receive. The White Paper states that the “undue market power” causes manufacturers to set artificially high list prices, which are reduced via rebates to PBMs without reducing the costs to consumers. The White Paper suggests that policies to decrease concentration in the PBM market could reduce the price of drugs paid by consumers.
  • Drug Pricing in Foreign Countries: The White Paper discusses in detail how the United States bears a disproportionate share of the burden of the cost of innovation, since foreign governments, in exercising price control, are able to set drug prices lower than that in the United States. The White Paper suggests drug pricing reform abroad with the United States changing the incentives of foreign governments to price drugs at levels that reward innovation. The White Paper broadly suggests achieving this goal through enhanced trade policy or policies tying reimbursement levels in the United States to prices paid by foreign governments that set lower prices or other methods.

EBG Considerations

The combined result of the 2019 Budget and the White Paper is a hodgepodge of policy ideas that could impact a wide range of government programs and industry stakeholders throughout the drug distribution and reimbursement channel. While the proposals set forth in the 2019 Budget are more specific, the ideas in the White Paper are more conceptual and less developed.  For example, policies to address the high concentration of the PBM market and foreign government drug price control appear more aspirational and lack detail on what such policies would entail or how they would be accomplished.  This suggests that, while the 2019 Budget and White Paper are indicative of the Administration’s direction with respect to drug pricing policy, the policy is likely still a “work in progress” and subject to further development.

We will continue to report on how these ideas take shape in this Administration.

In the last couple of months, ballot initiatives have significantly affected health policy and the health industry as a whole. Constituents are becoming more involved in policy matters that have traditionally been left to elected officials in state legislatures. On January 25, 2018, Oregon held a special election for a ballot initiative that asked whether Oregonians would support funding the state Medicaid program by taxing health plans and hospitals. The ballot initiative passed with a margin of 62 percent of voters supporting the measure. The measure proposed a 1.5 percent tax on insurance premiums and a .7 percent tax on large hospitals to help fund Medicaid expansion. Proponents argued that 350,000 people who receive health coverage through Medicaid expansion would lose coverage if the measure was not supported.

Oregon is not the only state that has used a ballot initiative to substantially affect health policy. On November 7, 2017, Maine was the first state to use a ballot initiative to expand Medicaid coverage. The ballot measure overwhelming passed without the support of the Governor. The Governor is now withholding the implementation of the measure due to fundamental issues on how to fund Medicaid expansion.

Traditionally, ballot initiatives are frequently used to amend state constitutions or topics regarding public health. Health policy issues such as Medicaid and funding for health care seldom had direct input from constituents. However, as many states are faced with one party legislature, ballot initiatives have become a way to circumvent the traditional means of legislating. Constituents are actively using ballot initiative to help shape policy issues that directly affect the health industry. About 24 states have ballot initiative processes that allow constituents to bypass state legislatures by placing proposed statutes on the ballot. Although states have different processes, a ballot initiative requires a specific number of signatures for an initiative to be placed on a ballot. In states with an indirect initiative process, such as Maine, ballots with enough signatures are submitted to the legislature where elected officials have an opportunity to act on the proposal. If the legislature rejects the measure, submits a different proposal or takes no action, the measure goes to the ballot for a vote. In states with direct initiatives, such as Oregon, proposals go directly on the ballot for a vote.

With the success of Oregon and Maine, other states may utilize the ballot initiative process to substantially change health policy in their state. For example, after years of failing to expand Medicaid in Utah, advocates have already begun to gather signatures needed by April 15, 2018 to put Medicaid expansion on the 2018 ballot. Additionally, advocates in Idaho have filed paperwork for a ballot initiative to expand Medicaid.

As more states consider ballot initiatives as a legislative tool for health policy, stakeholders should not only look to legislative assemblies for changes in health policy but ballot initiatives that can affect the industry. Grassroots advocacy has always played a major role in shaping state policy and now substantial health policy can be added to the list.

The National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”) – passed in late 2016 – provides numerous changes to military health care. One of the changes, NDAA Sec. 706, establishes the Military-Civilian Integrated Health Care Delivery Systems – a sweeping new change for the Defense Health Agency (“DHA”) and the Military Treatment Facilities (“MTFs”) to provide health care services for non-active duty beneficiaries through partnerships with the private sector.

These private sector partnerships require the Secretary of Defense by January 1, 2018, to enter into Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) and contracts between the MTFs and:

  • Health maintenance organizations
  • Health care centers of excellence
  • Public or private academic medical institutions
  • Regional health organizations
  • Integrated health systems
  • Accountable care organizations, and
  • Other health systems as the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

This is an opportunity for these organizations to provide health care to the military dependents and retirees either in its own facilities utilizing capitated payments, bundled payments, or pay for performance. NDAA Section 706 makes clear that the covered beneficiaries are eligible to enroll in and receive medical services under the private sector components of the military-civilian integrated health delivery systems listed above. Of course, the health care services must be comparable to the quality of services received by beneficiaries at an MTF.

What is the purpose of the Military-Civilian Integrated Health Care Delivery System?

The Military-Civilian Integrated Health Care Delivery System is designed to improve access to health care and outcomes while enhancing the health care experience for beneficiaries. And the NDAA provides for the sharing of resources – such as staff, equipment, and training assets – between the Department of Defense (“DoD”) and the private sector to carry out the integrated health delivery systems. Importantly, services within the MTF that are essential for the maintenance of the DoD operation medical force readiness skills of health care providers must be maintained and members of the Armed Forces must be provided additional training opportunities to maintain these skills.

What will be included in the Military-Civilian Integrated Health Care Delivery System?

There are 9 major elements in the Military-Civilian Integrated Health Care Delivery System:

  1. Deliver high quality health care as measured by leading national health quality measurement organizations;
  2. Achieve greater efficiency in the delivery of health care by identifying and implementing within each such system improvement opportunities that guide patients through the entire continuum of care, thereby reducing variations in the delivery of health care and preventing medical errors and duplication of medical services;
  3. Improve population-based health outcomes by using a team approach to deliver case management prevention, and wellness services to high-need and high cost patients;
  4. Focus on preventive care that emphasizes:
    (A) Early detection and timely treatment of disease;
    (B) Periodic health screenings; and
    (C) Education regarding healthy lifestyle behaviors;
  5. Coordinate and integrate health care across the continuum of care, connecting all aspects of healthcare received by the patient, including the patient’s health care team;
  6. Facilitate access to health care providers, including
    (A) After-hours care;
    (B) Urgent care; and
    (C) Through telehealth appointments when appropriate;
  7. Encourage patients to participate in making health care decisions;
  8. Use evidence based treatment protocols that improve the consistency of health care and eliminate ineffective, wasteful healthcare practices; and
  9. Improve coordination of behavioral health services with primary health care.

Overall, these elements seek to provide high quality care more effectively and efficiently with a focus on providing preventative care as well as convenient access to providers.

In an Advisory Opinion dated October 20, 2017, to Crouse Health Hospital (“Crouse Hospital”), the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) agreed that the Non-Profit Institutions Act (“NPIA”) would protect the sale of discounted drugs from Crouse Hospital to the employees, retirees, and their dependents of an affiliated medical practice (Crouse Medical Practice, PLLC) (“Medical Practice”) from antitrust liability under the Robinson-Patman Act.  Significantly, the FTC provided this advice despite the fact that the Medical Practice is a for-profit entity, and is not owned by Crouse Hospital.

The Robinson-Patman Act is primarily a consumer protection statute that prohibits, among other things, discrimination in the sale of like kind products, including pharmaceuticals, to different buyers.  As a result, and absent some exemption, the resale of discounted drugs purchased by a not-for-profit hospital to its patients would be subject to challenge.

The NPIA, however, exempts from the reach of the Robinson-Patman Act the sale of discounted drugs to “schools, colleges, universities, public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit,” provided those drugs are purchased for that entity’s “own use”.  15 U.S.C.A. § 13(f). The Supreme Court, in Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass’n, 425 U.S. 1 (1976), defined “own use” to mean “what reasonably may be regarded as use by the hospital in the sense that such use is a part of and promotes the hospital’s intended institutional operation in the care of persons who are its patients.”  Id. at 14.  The Supreme Court went on to conclude, among other things,  that the resale of discounted drugs to a hospital’s employees and their dependents would qualify as the hospital’s “own use.”  The FTC, in a number of prior Advisory Opinions, further extended the application of the NPIA to the sale of discounted drugs to employees of hospital affiliates, and other similar entities.  However, those entities were generally not-for-profit entities, likely eligible for protection under the NPIA on their own, and owned and/or controlled by the hospital.

The Advisory Opinion to Crouse Hospital is unique in that the Medical Practice is a for profit entity and clearly would not be eligible for protection on its own under the NPIA.  Furthermore, the Medical Practice is not directly owned by Crouse Hospital calling into question whether the resale could qualify as the hospital’s “own use” as required by the NPIA.

Despite these facts, the FTC concluded that NPIA should apply to the resale of discounted drugs to the employees, retirees, and their dependents of the Medical Group because: 1) Crouse Hospital was responsible for the formation of the Medical Practice and did so “to develop an integrated medical service system to encourage both organizations to work together to improve care and promote the charitable purposes of Course Hospital”; 2) Crouse Hospital, despite not owning the Medical Practice, still had ultimate decision-making control and authority over the Medical Practice; and, 3) all profits earned by the Medical Practice were assigned to Crouse Hospital.  Based on these factors, the FTC determined that “Crouse Medical Practice is an integral part of Crouse Hospital’s ability to fulfill its intended institutional function of providing care and promoting community health,” and, therefore, the resale was for Crouse Hospital’s own use.

Hospitals and health systems should take note that simply because an affiliate is a for profit entity does not automatically mean NPIA protection does not apply. A deeper look into the relationship between the hospital and affiliate, and consideration of the affiliate’s mission may support an extension of the NPIA.